

This book is extremely well researched and highlights the expanse of British army uniforms during 30 years of the eighteenth century that witnessed great military activity. The cut and colour of the army uniforms are fully illustrated to enable military historians to visually comprehend troops and their choreography in the field. This book fits nicely alongside the author's previously published book on British Napoleonic uniforms and other books on military uniforms. Though a specialty book, the contents will have wide appeal as the time period covers two important wars of the eighteenth century, which are of interest to many different research groups, including military historians, dress historians, battlefield re-enactors, costume designers for the television and film industry, and military fiction writers.

The book offers a fresh perspective and new research that add to the debate on uniform design and relevance. There are no logical flaws to identify in this enjoyable read. The research methods utilised were appropriate and obtained more than satisfactory results. If the author had had additional time and space, it might have been rewarding to view contemporary paintings and other art historical evidence in the book to substantiate the archival evidence of published uniform regulations. Additionally, uniforms of the artillery or specialty troops, such as engineers, are excluded from the book, but it was no surprise or disappointment as from the very beginning the author had purposely conveyed the well-defined parameters of the book to cavalry and infantry uniforms, exclusively. The book incorporates an incredible visual array of British army uniforms in stunning detail, with solid sources, logical organisation, and a graphically pleasing presentation. This book would be a fine addition to the personal library of anyone who is interested in British soldiers of the eighteenth century.

JENNIFER DALEY  
King's College, London

**Gemma Clark, *Everyday Violence in the Irish Civil War*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016. Notes, Index, Bibliography, Photographs, pp. 229. ISBN: 978-113-956-836-4. Paperback. Price £27.99.**

Long the great taboo of Irish history, the Irish Civil War, 1922-1923, was marked by fratricidal violence and bitter local animosities, and remains the under-researched conflict that dare not speak its name. A new generation of scholars, however, is challenging this, including Gemma Clark, whose pioneering study analyses the Civil War in terms of new sources and fresh methodology. Examining patterns of Civil War

[www.bjmh.org.uk](http://www.bjmh.org.uk)

## REVIEWS

violence in three Munster counties – Limerick, Tipperary and Waterford – Clark adopts a welcome thematic format, looking at three key forms of ‘everyday violence’, arson, intimidation and physical violence to the person, including sexual attacks. Clark’s concept of ‘everyday violence’ proves a very effective definition for the patterns of social behaviours under examination. The study is based on overlooked archives. The Irish Free State’s Ministry of Finance and the British Government set up separate compensation bodies for victims of Civil War violence. Clark has mined their files well, examining over 2000 claims, bringing to light vivid new testimonies of the war’s impact. However, the book’s second chapter needed greater clarity on the complex administrative compensation structures and remits.

Clark concludes that most Civil War violence was damage to property: arson against the ‘big houses’ of the gentry; cattle-rustling; and boycotts of businesses perceived as associated with the former British or the new Free State regime. In contrast, the deliberate killing of civilians occurred less frequently and sexual violence was rare. This is an important finding: studies on County Cork by Gerard Murphy and Peter Hart, admittedly a much more violent area than the three counties Clark examines, suggest murder was more frequent. Free State infrastructure – the postal and rail services, in particular – were clear targets, but so too were well-off graziers, their land coveted for redistribution by the rural poor, who, inspired by propaganda rhetoric about their rights to ownership of the nation’s land, saw the Civil War power vacuum as an opportunity to seize farms. Some violence took traditional forms, such as cattle maiming, harking back to the Land War and, while the Irregular IRA was at times involved, Clark’s evidence suggests local intra-community mobilisations against those perceived as Loyalists or Free Staters went beyond Irish Republican Army (IRA) control. However, the fact that only Free State archive claims for Damage to Property survive – the compensation claims for Personal Injury have been lost – does, Clark acknowledges, necessitate some caution in arguing most violence was against property, although the British Government’s Irish Grants Committee files help fill the gap.

By examining ‘everyday violence’ Clark shows how the war escalated beyond the fault-lines of a conflict between the Free State and the IRA. The Civil War saw the continuation and increase of War of Independence violence against those Protestants and Catholics who had supported British rule. The new Free State lacked the necessary control of Munster to secure them; British forces, their erstwhile protectors, had withdrawn. Former Royal Irish Constabulary men and ex-British army soldiers, as well as those whose businesses had served the British forces, were driven out through actual and threatened violence. Clark is particularly effective in her balanced discussion of the disproportionate targeting of the Protestant minority in her three selected counties and its impact. Their population fell dramatically: 89 per cent had left Tipperary town by 1926; 65 per cent from Carrick-on-Suir (147). Economic migration

partly explains this, but Clark finds violent threat and sectarianism were elements of Civil War chaos.

A strength of this polished study is its engagement with the latest Irish and European historiography. It situates developments in Ireland in the context of broader European violent trends, arguing that the Irish Civil War remained relatively restrained compared to the mass killings of civilians in Central and Eastern Europe in the revolutionary and nationalist turmoil after the Great War. Clark also contends that Irish Civil War violence was more political and closely linked to national macro-agendas than Stathis Kalyvas's theories on civil war violence suggest. Clark is surely right that, while sectarianism occurred, it was the contestation of land and new political nationalisms that drove the Irish case. The Free State itself by offering compensation to all those targeted by the insurgent IRA, showed considerable liberal-mindedness, even if, its impecuniousness meant that payments were regularly inadequate: many of those forced to flee Ireland were unable to ever return and rebuild.

One is left with much to ponder from this fascinating study, not least how the destruction of infrastructure and purging of local urban mercantile groups may have impacted upon the struggling Free State economy in the 1920s. As the centenary of these traumatic events in Irish history approaches, Clark's measured academic scholarship is invaluable.

HEATHER JONES

The London School of Economics and Political Science

**Edward Kaplan, *To Kill Nations: American Strategy in the Air-Atomic Age and the Rise of Mutually Assured Destruction*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2015. Notes, Bibliography, Index, pp. 260. ISBN 978-0-8014-5248-2. Hardback. Price £28.85.**

The irony of the US Air Force's Strategic Air Command (SAC) – is that it worked! This is the underlying theme of Edward Kaplan's book on American strategy in the 'air-atomic age'. Unlike the film portrayals of real life characters such as General Curtis LeMay in *Thirteen Days*, or in fictional accounts such as Generals Jack D. Ripper and 'Buck' Turgidson in *Dr Strangelove* or James Mattoon Scott in *Seven Days in May*, Kaplan reassures us that US Air Force generals in the 1950s and early 1960s were not insubordinate to their political masters nor overly keen advocates of launching nuclear first strikes against the Soviet Union, even if they often appeared to be. Instead, these individuals were usually careful and calculating, if not overly self-confident, especially

[www.bjmh.org.uk](http://www.bjmh.org.uk)