

REVIEWS

Byron Farwell, *Maps*. Barnsley: Pen & Sword, 2017. Notes, Index, Bibliography, Photographs, pp. 394. ISBN: 184-884-015-2. Paperback. Price £18.99.

While Pen & Sword are to be congratulated in reprinting this text, a classic example of a narrative military history, written with the insight of a former British Army officer and first published by Allen Lane in 1973, it is a shame that they have not updated the analysis, references, and interpretation. The book is produced in a splendidly readable format, and is embellished with 34 excellent illustrations, but it remains a work based entirely on secondary sources culled from the pre-1970 era. It lacks thereby the benefit of source material that could be found in archives, both in Britain and overseas, in parliamentary papers, and in carefully edited and annotated private diaries produced since the 1960s by professional historians, postgraduate researchers, contributors to the volumes of the Army Records Society, biographers, and other scholars.

The volume has its charms, reminding the reader of a form of descriptive, narrative history rarely seen in modern military history. It is written in a positive manner, highlighting the purported virtues and qualities of the officer gentleman, and is presented without any sense of political correctness (the Cape Frontier Wars are still the 'Kaffir Wars'), elaborate referencing (none of the quotes are referenced), and a contented reliance upon imperial measurements. Pen portraits abound of famous and less famous officers: Eldred Pottinger apparently 'possessed all the admired Anglo-Saxon virtues: he was brave, clever, virtuous, adventurous, and ... extremely energetic' (p. 5). Britain's adversaries receive a similar, pithy treatment: the Chitralis were 'a cruel and charming people, treacherous and fun-loving' (p. 299). The sweeping generalisations sometimes produce blatant contradictions: during the Indian Mutiny, 'few of the severely wounded recovered; amputees invariably died' (p. 100) but at least two of the Scots, who lost arms in this conflict, Lieutenant-Colonel John Ewart (p. 126) and Sir Archibald Alison (p. 195), had lengthy military careers thereafter.

More serious lapses occur in respect of Farwell's analysis: the Crimean Army, formed by Wellington, 'had learned nothing and forgotten nothing' (p. 70), a view long since debunked by Sir Hew Strachan. Moreover, Farwell's descriptions of Sir Garnet Wolseley as an officer, who 'railed against abuses, inefficiencies, and anachronisms in the army' (p. 184) might have been tempered had he read Adrian Preston (ed.), *In Relief of Gordon*, which appeared in 1967. The Cardwell reforms are hailed as a boon to recruiting and as enabling battalions to be sent overseas 'largely composed of trained men' (p. 189), a verdict that few scholars would still accept. The 'great battle of the routes', which preceded Wolseley's move into the Sudan receives only a perfunctory paragraph (p. 283), and, on the subsequent re-conquest of the Sudan,

references are rightly made to the contributions of Kitchener, MacDonald and Girouard but not to the crucial role of Wingate as an intelligence gatherer, analyst, and propagandist. Finally, Farwell perpetuates the myth that the South African War was a 'white man's war', and that it was only 'towards the end of the war when the British armed native scouts and guards' (p. 349). In fact, Black Africans provided invaluable firepower in the defence of Mafeking and, by 1900, armed Black Africans served on both sides of the investment. Unfortunately, in describing the Mafeking siege, Farwell relies upon the highly tendentious commentary of Brian Gardner and depicts it as 'something of a lark' (p. 352).

The balance of the writing, too, is somewhat awry, with extensive coverage of the campaigns in India and on the North-West Frontier, but scant commentary upon Canadian expeditions (other than Wolseley's Red River campaign), and perfunctory remarks on the Maori wars, and only twelve pages devoted to the 3-month Anglo-Transvaal War compared with fourteen pages allocated to the 32-month South African War (which Farwell wrote about separately).

Unfortunately, the lapses of balance and analysis largely detract from the value of this volume, but it is useful to remember how British military history was once written to appreciate the progress that has since been made.

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Kenneth Payne, *The Psychology of Strategy: Exploring Rationality in the Vietnam War*. London: Hurst & Company, 2015. Notes, Bibliography, Index, pp. 213. ISBN 978-184-904-337-3. Hardback. Price £25.00.

Why and how authorities execute strategy is at the centre of Kenneth Payne's thought-provoking book, *The Psychology of Strategy: Exploring Rationality in the Vietnam War*. Payne explores the decision-making of U.S. presidents Lyndon B. Johnson and Richard M. Nixon from a psychological perspective. Influenced by Carl von Clausewitz, *The Psychology of Strategy* seeks to deepen the highly-esteemed general's contentions through an analysis of American strategy during the Vietnam War.

For Payne, there are three types of strategists: the 'unconscious', the 'egoistical', and the 'angry'. Indeed, for the author, strategy is as emotional as it is steeped in conscious and unconscious decisions made by individuals. Consequently, he uses the Vietnam War as a lens through which he analyses the impact of political, emotion, and chance

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